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The results reported in this article show that at least 40 % of all unemployment spells in 
Denmark are due to temporary layoffs. The duration of unemployment is analysed taking 
into account the distinction between temporary and permanent layoffs. The importance of 
this distinction is investigated by comparing the results from a single risk model with the 
results from a competing risks model. The results show that there are several important 
differences between the recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate with respect to both 






















































































































































































It has been recognized for a long time that many of the workers who are laid off in the 
U.S. and Canada return to their previous employers after their spell of unemployment. 
These temporary layoffs constitute a large proportion of all unemployment, and they have 
given rise to a huge amount of both theoretical and empirical research. However, in a 
European context temporary layoffs have not received much attention, presumably because 
there seems to be a common belief that this phenomenon is much less common in European 
labour markets. This view has for instance been brought forward by FitzRoy and Hart 
(1985), who also question the conventional wisdom that the reason behind this is a more 
widespread use of short-time working.
The distinction between temporary and pennanent layoffs will be important when ana­
lysing the duration of unemployment, since the type of spell may be expected to have 
considerable impact on the behaviour on both the supply side and the demand side of the 
labourmarket. In the vast majority of studies of unemployment durations that have emerged 
during the past 10 years the distinction has nevertheless been ignored, but recently a few 
studies have noted the importance; see Ham and Rea (1987), Han and Hausman (1990) 
and Katz and Meyer (1988)1.
The purpose of this article is twofold: firstly, it is pointed out that in Denmark a very large 
fraction of all unemployment spells are due to temporary layoffs, and secondly, the duration 
of unemployment is analysed taking into account the fact that an unemployment spell may 
end by one of several different causes. The latter is done through specification and esti­
mation of competing risks models with cause specific hazard rates. The results from this 
model are compared with the results from an econometric duration model ignoring the 
distinction, i.e. a single risk model.
1. Edin (1989) also analyses different exits out of unemployment, but he distinguishes between transitions 



























































































The seminal work of Feldstein (1976) gives the theoretical background for the existence 
of temporary layoffs. When considering the duration of unemployment, search theory is 
relevant, and a number of contributions have analysed the possibility of recall to the 
previous job and its consequences on the duration of unemployment; see for instance 
Burdett and Mortensen (1980), Pissarides (1982), White (1983), and Katz (1986). The 
duration of a temporary layoff is determined mainly through the probability of recall and 
the firm may influence this by choosing the optimal point in time to recall workers; see 
Haltiwanger (1984) and Pissarides (1982). The optimal job-searching strategy for workers 
on layoff clearly depends on the probability of recall, and this probability will typically 
influence both the reservation wage and the search intensity for a new job. Workers may 
or may not search for a new job while on temporary layoff depending on the level of the 
recall probability, and they may also change their search activity during the layoff. If the 
recall probability changes over time (or the worker is uncertain about the likelihood of 
recall) that will also lead to changes in the probability of finding and accepting a new job. 
A realistic situation may be that the longer a worker is unemployed without recall, the 
lower he will perceive the recall probability to be. Katz (1986) discusses this case and 
shows that it leads to an increasing (over time) search intensity for a new job and a declining 
reservation wage, which together gives a transition rate into a new job with positive duration 
dependence (at the same time as the recall transition rate has negative duration dependence, 
although this is rather mechanically or exogenously determined). The main thing to notice 
from this discussion of theoretical contributions is that there are reasons to expect that the 
mechanisms behind reemployment in the previous job and in a new job are quite different. 
Explanatory factors may hence influence the transition rates in different ways, and the 
duration dependence of the two transition rates may also be different.
The article is organized as follows. It starts with a brief description of the data and of how 
the spells of temporary and permanent layoffs are constructed. Then the magnitude of 
temporary layoffs are presented. Section 3 contains the analysis of the unemployment 
durations. Firstly, various methodological issues are discussed and the specification of the 
econometric model is described. Secondly, the estimation results from the analysis of the 
unemployment durations are presented and discussed. Finally, some concluding remarks 




























































































2. Data and the amount of temporary layoffs
The data used in this study are drawn from a large Danish longitudinal data set. The 
complete data set consists of a random sample of approximately 240,000 adults (ap­
proximately 5% of the Danish adult population) with information taken from a number of 
Danish administrative registers2. The data set contains information on a large number of 
demographic, educational, and labour market variables as well as information on income 
and wealth for the years 1976-1985.
However, the data set only contains detailed information on unemployment from the be­
ginning of 1979, since this type of information has only been centrally registered since 
then. The data on employment drawn from the supplementary pension scheme (ATP) cover 
the years up till 1984 included. Asa consequence, spells of employment and unemployment 
can only be constructed for the years 1979-1984.
The results reported here are all based on a subsample of the complete data set selected 
by random sampling of approximately 11,000 persons. This section will first give a brief 
description of the variables of the data set which are used in the subsequent duration 
analysis. Next, it will be described how unemployment spells are constructed on the basis 
of the data from the unemployment register and how the data from the supplementary 
pension scheme may be employed to classify these spells into temporary and permanent 
layoff spells. Finally, a descriptive analysis of the unemployment spells is given presenting 
some measures of the amount of temporary layoffs as well as a sensitivity analysis of these 
measures.
The variables of the data set comprise a number of demographic variables. AGE and 
MARRIED are self explanatory. The indicator variable PROVINCE takes on the value of 
1 when the person lives outside the Copenhagen metropolitan area. The variable CHILD 
0-6 indicates the presence of children in the pre-school age. The variable SICK is an 
indicator variable taking the value 1 when the person has received sickness benefits during 
the year. As a general rule sickness benefits are received if a person has a spell of illness 
for more than 13 weeks. The only educational variable included is the indicator variable 
APPRENTICE, which takes on the value 1 when the person has had an apprenticeship.




























































































The labour market variables are partly indicator variables giving the unemployment in­
surance fund (which is overlapping with trade union) and the industry of the worker, and 
partly measurement variables. The unemployment insurance fund variables are SID, KAD, 
METAL, HK, CONSTR, ACADEMIC, and OTHER. The industry variables are quite 
comprehensive and will often be grouped together in the empirical analysis. The names 
of the variables will be self explanatory. PART TIME takes on the value of 1 when the 
person is part time insured. Most often that covers a part time worker. The variable EX­
PERIENCE measures the accumulated work experience since entry to the labour market 
as a wage earner. The variable REPLACEM is the replacement ratio between the unem­
ployment benefits and the wage. WEALTH measures the net taxable wealth of the person 
and may thus be either negative or positive.
In addition to these variables the data set also contains information on unemployment for 
all individuals who are members of an insurance fund (and a few others who experience 
unemployment and receive social benefits). This information comes from the unem­
ployment register and gives for each week the fraction of the week for which unemployment 
benefits are paid. Information on employment is given for all persons who are wage earners 
and it comes from the register for the supplementary labour market pension (ATP). It 
basically consists of the number of hours worked (although approximated by a stepwise 
linear function) at a given employer within a specified period.
The main purpose of the unemployment register is administrative, as it is used for disbursing 
unemployment benefits. As a consequence the quality of the data is considered to be high. 
For analytical purposes it is, however, necessary to convert the fractions of weeks into 
genuine spells of unemployment. Several problems arise in constructing such spells due 
to the administrative rules and practices that have been used when recording the data. 
These problems have been overcome by applying certain definitions to the data and by 
constructing a simulation algorithm, which is used to simulate the administrative rules that 
infer with the data registration process (mainly the rules of the Danish vacation act). The 
result of removing the spurious effects of the vacation act is that the average duration of 
unemployment spells increases while the number of spells decreases. These constructed 
unemployment spells correspond closer to the theoretical definition of unemployment3.




























































































The next step is to identify those unemployment spells that end in reemployment with the 
same employer4 5. Again, certain definitions have to be made. Since there will always be 
an element of judgement, it has been chosen to apply a relatively restrictive strategy, which 
rather identifies too few spells as temporary, than the opposite. As a consequence only 
unemployment spells directly following an employment spell can be considered as tem­
porary layoff. If the same employer is registered as having paid contributions to the 
supplementary pension scheme immediately before and immediately after the unem­
ployment spell, the spell will be characterized as temporary layoff. There are, however, a 
few caveats in the classification procedure which leads to a downward bias in the estimate 
of the number of temporary layoffs.
Another type of unemployment related to temporary layoff will not be identified by the 
classification algorithm used here. That is the unemployment that is created when a person 
regularly has periodic employment with a few different employers within the same industry 
interleaving with short term unemployment. With the work force "rotating" between 
employers in this way, the method described above will not characterize the interleaving 
unemployment spells as temporary layoffs. Nielsen (1987) found that in certain industries 
it is very common with many periodic jobs. The Danish construction industry is char­
acterized by many small firms within the same sector and it is very common with the 
described "rotation" of workers, hence we may expect an extra downward bias in the 
estimate of the amount of temporary layoffs. The same argument applies to the hotel and 
restaurant sector.
For the analysed sample, it is found that 40% of all unemployment spells are due to 
temporary layoff. Because these spells are generally shorter than permanent layoff spells 
this amounts only to 16% of the total unemployment. However, the whole technique makes 
this a very conservative assessment. Another Danish source using a different data set and 
also including short-time working suggests that 20% of the total unemployment is due to 
temporary layoffs in a more broad senses. Our results do not show any significant cyclical 
variation in the amount of temporary layoffs over the investigated six-year period.
The method used above classifies all unemployment spells where the worker returns to 
the previous employer as temporary layoffs regardless of the duration. The amount of 
temporary layoff unemployment will of course depend on whether long unemployment
4. This definition of temporary layoff corresponds closely to the definition used by Feldstein (1975,1976).




























































































spells are allowed to be classified as temporary layoffs. It will probably not be associated 
with any promise of reemployment if an unemployment spell of, say, 18 months duration 
ends with the worker returning to the previous employer. Instead that situation will typically 
be caused by specific educational and geographical reasons that makes the person im­
mobile. It may thus be interesting to investigate the sensitivity of the two measures of 
temporary layoff unemployment when using various duration limits in the definition of 
temporary layoffs.
The percentage of the unemployment spells categorized as temporary layoffs is rather 
insensitive to the duration limit, which is because the temporary layoffs are concentrated 
among spells with short duration. Not until the duration limit reaches 10 weeks (from 
above) has it any importance for the proportion of spells. The duration limit is more 
important for the proportion of unemployment since long unemployment spells have a 
higher weight in this measure. A rather smooth decrease can be observed in this proportion 
when the duration limit is lowered, for instance from 16 % to 14 % if a 40 weeks limit is 
applied and to 8 % if a 10 weeks limit is applied.
The amount of temporary layoff unemployment found in this study for Denmark is similar 
to the amount found for other countries. Robertson (1989) reports that in Canada more 
than 50 % of all unemployment spells are terminated because the worker returns to the 
previous employer. In manufacturing this proportion is even 75 %. Temporary layoffs 
constitute more than 30 % of the total unemployment. These figures are based on data 
from administrative registers and are hence comparable with the Danish figures. Lilien 
(1980) has investigated the amount of temporary layoff unemployment in manufacturing 
in the U.S. for the period 1965-1976, and he finds that 68 % of all spells are temporary 
layoffs and that these spells are equal to 30 % of the total unemployment in manufacturing 
in the U.S. Apart from the fact that these figures are estimated from establishment data, 
they are comparable with the Danish and Canadian figures. Katz and Meyer (1988) report 
that 57 % of all unemployment spells in Missouri and Pennsylvania, USA, are temporary 
layoffs and they find this to equal 32 % of the total unemployment. This result is, however, 
based on a small sample for the period 1979-1980 and includes only persons actually 
receiving unemployment benefits. Due to differences in the unemployment insurance 




























































































3. Duration of unemployment distinguishing temporary and permanent 
layoffs
Whether an unemployment spell is a temporary or a permanent layoff may be expected to 
have considerable impact on the individual behaviour for instance with respect to job 
search, and hence when analysing the duration of unemployment the two cases may be 
very different both with respect to duration dependence and with respect to the effects of 
explanatory variables. As mentioned in the introduction several theoretical arguments can 
be given for the differences between temporary and permanent layoffs, and hence we 
should not a priori analyse the duration of unemployment ignoring this distinction.
We have in an earlier study (Jensen and Westerg&rd-Nielsen (1990)) found that there are 
important distinguishing characteristics between temporary and permanent layoffs. Esti­
mation of a binary choice model for the probability that a given spell is due to either 
temporary or permanent layoff shows that there are distinct differences between persons 
experiencing the two types of layoffs. Furthermore, in that analysis, the sign of the co­
efficient of the replacement ratio seems to conform with the theory of compensating wage 
differentials. It is found that a lower replacement ratio (higher wage) means a higher 
probability of temporary layoff. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that wage compen­
sation is given to those temporarily laid off. In this article we do, however, only focus our 
attention on analysis of the duration of the two types of unemployment spells. We will 
first briefly consider the econometric methodology, and then the estimation results are 
presented and discussed.
3.1. Econometric methodology
The econometric analysis of the unemployment durations is in this study performed through 
analysis of the hazard function for the unemployment durations. This method has gained 
increasingly popularity since it was first applied by Lancaster (1979). The hazard function 
is the conditional density that the unemployment spell ends at time t given that it had not 
done so before time t
h(t) = f(T  = t \  T >t)
where T  is the duration of the unemployment spell. The survivor and density function for 
the unemployment duration associated with h(t) are given by
- f '*(»)*




























































































If all unemployment spells are of the same type or if the cause by which the spell ends is 
not taken into consideration, the approach just described would be sufficient to analyse 
the duration of unemployment with a given specification of the hazard function. This will 
be referred to as a single risk model, since it implicitly assumes that there is only one way 
to leave unemployment. If, on the other hand, unemployment may end by one of several 
different causes, a cause specific hazard rate may be specified for each cause j, giving
rise to a competing risks model.
For the competing risks model with several cause specific hazard rates the density of a 
complete spell ending by cause j  is given by
where the survivor function (the probability of a spell lasting longer than r) is equal to
with h(s) = "Ljhjls). Hence, an incomplete spell contributes S(t) to the likelihood function,
whereas a complete spell ending by cause j  contributes In the absence of cross-re­
strictions on the parameters of the cause specific hazard rates in the competing risks model, 
the log-likelihood function is additively separable in the parameters of each hazard rate, 
which means that maximum likelihood estimates can be found by maximizing each term 
separately. Estimating the parameters of hj thus boils down to maximizing a log-likelihood 
function of the form
where 5  ̂= 1 if the spell ends by cause j  and 8  ̂= 0 if it ends by another cause or is right
censored. It is thus seen that estimation of the parameters of hj is performed by treating 
unemployment spells ending by all other causes as right censored. The maximum likelihood 
estimates of the unknown parameters are found by the iterative Newton-Raphson method 





























































































For the empirical analysis the hazard functions will be specified conditional on a vector 
of explanatory variables x, and we will use the proportional hazard specification where 
the hazard function factors into the product of a function of t and a function of the vector 
x
h(f I x) = A.(r>y(x)
The individual specific factor y(x) will be specified as e Sx, where (3 is a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. The baseline hazard \( t)  is supposed to pick up the duration 
dependence of the hazard function, and it will be specified as a Weibull hazard function 
tp. Notice, that this parametrization of the Weibull hazard function implies that it exhibits 
negative (positive) duration dependence when the coefficient p is negative (positive).
We want to focus our attention on the differences that may exist between temporary and 
permanent layoff spells both with respect to explanatory variables and with respect to the 
duration dependence. To investigate the importance of these differences we specify and 
estimate both a single risk model and a competing risks model for reemployment. In the 
single risk model we only specify the total reemployment rate hs(t | x) without taking into 
consideration the type of reemployment. In the competing risks model we allow for the 
fact that reemployment may occur either (1) with the previous employer, or (2) with a new 
employer. Hence, two separate cause specific hazard rates are specified, hT(t | x) being the 
hazard rate for returning to the previous employer and hP(t | x) being the hazard rate for 
finding a new job. The total reemployment rate in the competing risks model is then equal 
to the sum of these two rates. Estimation of the reemployment rate hs{t | x) in the single 
risk model will not be able to distinguish between different effects on the two types of 
reemployment. The main advantage of the competing risks model is that it allows us to 
specify and estimate the impact of the explanatory variables on the two separate em­
ployment rates.
In fact, we implicitly consider an additional risk or possibility of exit from unemployment 
in both the single risk model and the competing risks model: the person may leave the 
state of unemployment by a transition out of the labour force rather than into employment6. 
In the sample there are a few unemployment spells that are terminated by the person leaving 
the labour force. These spells are treated as right censored spells both in the estimation of 
the hazard rate for reemployment in the single risk model and in the estimation of the





























































































competing risks model. Hence, what we term a single risk model is strictly speaking a 
competing risks model with two types of exit, and our competing risks model does in fact 
have three types of exit (although we do not estimate the parameters of the cause specific 
hazard rate for transitions out of the labour force).
In the competing risks model each cause specific hazard rate is specified as proportional 
hazard functions with Weibull baseline hazards as described above. We thus estimate and 
report the parameters of the following three hazard rates
/i/f |x ) = t V ' \  j= S ,T ,P
3.2. Estimation results
For the duration analysis the sample has been divided into eight different sex-age cat­
egories. The four age groups are 16-24 years, 25-39 years, 40-54 years and 55 years and 
older. Both the two cause specific hazard rates in the competing risks model and the hazard 
rate for reemployment in the single risk model have been estimated. The latter is estimated 
treating all unemployment spells that end with a transition into employment similarly. This 
allows us to compare the results that take into account the distinction between temporary 
and permanent layoffs and the results of ignoring this distinction. The maximum likelihood 
estimates of the coefficients of the hazard rates are given in tables 1 and 2.
Let us first consider the impact of the explanatory variables on the hazard rates. Many of 
the explanatory variables have different effects on the two cause specific hazard rates in 
the competing risks model. As an example consider the sickness variable for which the 
results show the same pattern for all groups. It has a positive impact on the new job rate 
hP, but a negative impact on the recall rate hT. If we consider only the single risk hazard 
rate hs, we may first notice that the effect of the sickness variable is insignificant for all 
groups except women 40-54 years old. Furthermore, the estimates for the eight groups 
vary with respect to signs, which together with the insignificance lead us to the conclusion 




























































































the single risk hazard rate. This is, however, because quite clear effects on the two separate 
hazard rates have been masked by ignoring the distinction between temporary and per­
manent layoffs7.
The results about the sickness variable merit some further interpretation. The negative 
impact on the recall rate is most probably caused by demand side effects in the sense that 
the employers do not want to rehire persons with a known history of health problems. One 
can imagine at least two reasons behind the results showing the positive effect on the new 
job rate. Either it is possible for the workers to conceal their health problems for potential 
employers or the workers with health problems are deliberately searching for new jobs 
which are less demanding or have better work environments.
One of the few variables that have an unambiguous effect on the two cause specific hazard 
rates is the indicator for children in the pre-school age for women. The effect of having 
children in the pre-school age is negative for women, so that women with young children 
tend to have longer unemployment durations than women without children or with older 
children. This negative effect is a consequence of a negative impact on both the recall rate 
and the new job rate. However, the results do not tell us the reasons behind this negative 
effect, but some possible explanations are a voluntary reduced search activity of the women, 
possibly due to a lack of day-care facilities, and a reaction from potential employers.
In general, the single risk hazard rate has fewer significant coefficients than the two cause 
specific hazard rates. This means that in a number of cases where an explanatory variable 
has a significant effect on either the recall rate or the new job rate (or both), this effect is 
not discovered when only considering the single risk hazard. Even if an effect is discovered 
from the estimates for the single risk hazard, the underlying effects on the two cause specific 
hazard rates may differ with respect to size as well as with respect to signs. This occurs 
because the estimates for the single risk hazard simply reflects an average effect, which 
depends on the relative number of different transitions.
The same picture emerges even more strongly when we consider the duration dependence 
in the unemployment durations as it is given by the estimation results. If we start by looking 
only at the single risk hazard rates we see that for all groups there is a strong negative 
duration dependence. When we instead look at the results from the competing risks model 
we see that this strong negative duration dependence is a consequence of an even stronger
7. Similar results can be obtained for a number of the other explanatory variables by examining the estimates 




























































































negative duration dependence in the recall rate hT and no (significant) duration dependence 
in the new job rate hP. Hence, the two cause specific hazard rates in the competing risks 
model show very different duration dependencies, and these results clearly illustrate the 
danger of only estimating and looking at the single risk hazard rate. It will not be able to 
capture the heterogeneous shapes of the cause specific hazard rates and may in fact lead 
to rather misleading conclusions about duration dependence, which in turn may cause 
erroneous policy recommendations.
Information about the number of spells and the values of the log-likelihood function are 
reported in table 3 together with some tests for the model. Two hypotheses about equality 
of the coefficients of the recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate have been tested 
by likelihood ratio tests. First, the hypothesis that the two cause specific hazard rates are 
equal has been tested, i.e. the hypothesis hT = hP (all coefficients are equal). This hypothesis 
is strongly rejected for all eight groups8. Next, the hypothesis that all the coefficients of 
the two cause specific hazard rates except the constant term are equal has been tested along 
the lines suggested by Narendranathan and Stewart ( 1989). Also this hypothesis is strongly 
rejected by the likelihood ratio test for all eight groups.
To further illustrate the difference in duration dependence and in magnitudes between the 
recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate we have graphed the hazard rates for a 
reference person in each group9. These graphs are shown in figure 1, where both the hazard 
rate obtained from the estimation of the single risk model and the two cause specific hazard 
rates from the competing risks model are graphed. It is seen that except for the oldest group 
the new job hazard rate is higher than the recall hazard rate after the short initial period of 
decrease. In general, it is also seen that men have higher hazard rates than women, which 
reflects that they experience shorter unemployment durations.
Table 4 gives the expected unemployment durations for the reference person in each group. 
By varying the characteristics of the reference person we have also illustrated the effect 
of changes in the explanatory variables on the expected durations. These results give a 
more intuitive understanding of the influence of the explanatory variables. It is seen that
8. A similar result has been obtained in the studies by Ham and Rea (1987), Han and Hausman (1990), and 
Katz and Meyer (1988).
9. The reference person is defined as a person with the typical characteristics of each group. The exact values 




























































































changes in the explanatory variables have relatively large effects on the expected durations, 
and there will thus be large differences between persons with different characteristics even 
within the same sex-age group.
Finally, consider the REPLACEM variable which has a negative effect on the hazard rates 
in all the cases where the effect is significantly different from zero (at a 5% significance 
level). These negative effects mainly occur for men. The negative effect means that the 
higher the replacement ratio is, the longer the unemployment duration tends to be. This 
result is in accordance with predictions from search theoretic models, where higher 
unemployment benefits reduce the search costs for a given wage offer distribution. Hence, 
our empirical results concerning the effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment 
duration are what would be expected from theoretical considerations. Our result that the 
replacement ratio does not have much influence on the hazard rates for women can be 
interpreted as indicating that their value of time in alternative (non-market) activities is 
higher than it is for men.
It is unlikely that we have been able to include all individual characteristics which affect 
the hazard rates as explanatory variables. It is well known that such unobserved hetero­
geneity may create bias in the estimates. To investigate whether there is unobserved het­
erogeneity a specification diagnostic has been applied to the estimated models (see Jensen 
(1987) or Lancaster (1985) for a derivation of this score test). The values of the diagnostic 
are shown in table 3 and they indicate that the models are plagued by unobserved hete­
rogeneity, so that the estimates may be biased. Specifically, the results show that both the 
recall and the new job hazard rates are biased toward more negative duration dependence 
or less positive duration dependence than if all the heterogeneity had been taken account 
of in the models. Hence, the unobserved heterogeneity affects the two hazard rates in the 
same direction, so our conclusions about the differences between these two hazard rates 
still tend to hold10.
It should be noticed that the results about the duration dependence of the hazard rates of 
course are restricted by the functional form chosen. In the Weibull specification with only 
one coefficient to capture the time variation, the hazard rates will be either monotonically 
increasing or decreasing and that may be too restrictive. If the baseline hazard is mis- 
specified, it may also cause the estimates of the other coefficients in the model to be biased.
10. For this reason we have avoided the additional, basically arbitrary, distributional assumptions about the 





























































































Furthermore, such misspecification may also cause the problem of unobserved hete­
rogeneity to be exaggerated and may hence account for the high values of the specification 
diagnostic11.
4. Conclusion
The results reported in this article show that at least 40 % of all unemployment spells in 
Denmark are due to temporary layoffs and that these spells account for at least 16 % of 
all unemployment. Hence, temporary layoffs are an important and common phenomenon, 
a fact which has hitherto been ignored for European labour markets. A reasonable ex­
planation of the prevalence of temporary layoffs in Denmark may be found in the structure 
of the unemployment insurance system, and to the degree that this system is different from 
what is found in other European countries, the results do not necessarily carry over to other 
countries.
The duration of unemployment has been analysed taking into account the distinction be­
tween temporary and permanent layoffs. The importance of this distinction is investigated 
by comparing the results from a single risk model with the results from a competing risks 
model where reemployment may occur either with the previous employer or with a new 
employer. Estimation of the competing risks model with cause specific hazard rates for 
reemployment shows that the determinants of the unemployment duration have very dif­
ferent effects on the recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate with respect to signs as 
well as significance. If we compare the duration dependence exhibited by the single risk 
hazard and the competing risks hazards we see that the former masks the shapes of the 
latter. The results indicate that all the negative duration dependence in the single risk hazard 
rate for reemployment (neglecting the type of layoff) seems to be due to the negative 
duration dependence in the recall hazard rate, whereas the new job hazard rate reveals no 
duration dependence or even a slightly positive duration dependence. Many of these dif­
ferences are in accordance with the predictions from theoretical search models taking into 
account the possibility of recall to the previous job.
The estimates from the single risk model mask these differences, and hence a number of 
important implications may be overlooked if only the single risk hazard rate is estimated 
and analysed. It will not be able to reflect the underlying mechanisms and to capture the 
heterogeneous shapes of the cause specific hazards. The usefulness of the competing risks




























































































approach is clearly illustrated by our results, that show that several of the effects are quite 
different for the two cause specific hazard rates. For previous and future studies of the 
duration of unemployment our results indicate that neglecting the different types of layoffs 
may lead to a serious bias in the results and conclusions.
In the few previous studies investigating the duration of unemployment with temporary 
and permanent layoffs for the U.S. there has been some emphasis on the effects of ex­
haustion of unemployment insurance on the hazard rates12. This issue has not been dealt 
with here, since it is of much less importance with the Danish unemployment insurance 
system, where the risk of running out of benefits is essentially non-existing. Such in­
stitutional differences will also have an important influence on the hazard rates and thereby 
on the expected durations of unemployment.
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Table 1. Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients of the hazard rates for men
(reemployment hazards).
16-24 25-39 40 -5 4 55-77
TYPE V *> K A K V ** K K
CONSTANT -2.6077






0 2 3 2 1
-2.8317




0 3 9 0 7
-3.7033




0 .9 7 9 6
-6.8654


































0 .0 0 7 7
-0.0606










0 .0 1 7 8
0.0183




































































0 .1 0 3 7
-0.0004


























































0 .0 0 6 7
0.0009












0 .0 0 2 6
-0.0012


















0 2 7 3 3
-0.1780
0 2 9 0 1
-0.8452
0 2 8 8 1
-1.7851

























0 2 6 0 4
-0.1922






















0 2 6 2 5
-0.2972




















0 .1 7 9 7
1.1558
0 2 7 7 5
0.3024






















0 2 8 8 8
-0.0175












































0 2 1 7 4
-0.2071
0 2 2 0 9
-0.3630
0 3 3 8 1
0.0681




0 2 1 2 4
-0.1245
















0 2 3 8 2
-0.5966

























Asymptotic standard errors are given below the estimates. 




























































































Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients of the hazard rates for women
(reemployment hazards).
16-24 25-39 40-54 55-77
TYPE A K A, *s At A, A, At *, *. *T A,
CONSTANT -5.1345






























































0 .0 1 3 7
0.0121
























0 .1 4 0 0
-0.4227
0 2 6 4 9
-0.8308
0 3 8 5 3
0.3218




















0 .1 4 4 7
0.1875
0 2 0 0 0
0.0187






















0 2 4 3 3
-0.4303






















0 2 0 8 1
0.6751


















0 2 7 1 8
WEALTH 0.0191
























0 2 1 9 7
-1.1415








0 2 0 4 8
-0.2542
0 2 0 3 6
-0.0110
0 2 6 1 0
-0.5832
0 .3 3 1 7
-0.5013




0 5 3 1 2
industr ies
MANUFACT 1.2932
0 2 0 0 0
2.3765
0 5 1 2 9
0.8691
0 2 3 2 1
1.0481
0 2 0 6 1
1.5067
0 3 3 9 2
0.5725
0 2 6 3 9
1.:2032 
0 3 1 2 1
1.8883




0 2 5 3 8
0.9096








0 3 2 3 6
0.7967












0 5 1 2 5
1.0675
0 2 1 6 0
0.9181
0 2 0 5 5
1.1996
0 3 3 9 6
0.7529
0 2 5 9 5
1.1510
0 3 0 9 7
1.7815
0 5 0 7 5
0.5974
0 3 9 5 1
0.6145








0 5 0 9 0
0.8714
0 2 1 1 4
1.0308
0 2 0 3 1
1.3978
0 3 3 6 7
0.7635
0 2 5 5 7
1.0809
0 3 0 9 2
1.7435
0 5 0 7 1
0.4496
0 3 9 4 7
0.4920
0 2 2 4 9
0.4557
0 2 9 1 2
0.4405














































0 2 0 6 3
-0.4699
0 2 9 5 8
-0.9730




0 2 1 8 8
-0.1565
















0 2 1 6 4
0.0907
























0 .0 5 8 3
Asymptotic standard errors are given below the estimates. 




























































































Table 3. Test statistics for maximum likelihood estimation of the hazard rates.
Men
16-24 25-39 40-54 55-77
TYPE A, *5 k h , V *»
Number of 
spells




1332 403 929 2747 1273 1474 1346 768 578 566 351 215
Log-likelihood
function
-7118 -2482 -5339 -14529 -7438 -8800 -7056 -4290 -3565 -3024 -1950 -1370
Specification
diagnostic
4.56 3.12 5.30 13.33 2.76 3.96 4.68 4.23 2.51 1.56 4.38
Test for hT = hP 
except con­
stant
228 374 242 160
Test for h j  = hP 440 388 268 192
Women
16-24 25-39 40-54 55-77
TYPE >h *T *T A,
Number of 
spells




1153 548 605 2582 1516 1066 1107 733 374 319 196 123
I>og-likelihood
function
-6255 -3185 -3703 -13573 -8431 -6667 -5689 -3915 -2355 -1687 -1092 -763
Specification
diagnostic
4.99 3.56 9.11 19.62 5.37 6.21 3.36 4.92 3.33
Test for hT = hF 
except con­
stant
330 450 254 90
Test for hT = hP 332 530 372 106
The specification diagnostic is for unobserved heterogeneity. Some values are missing due to numerical 
difficulties. It follows a standard normal distribution in the case with no unobserved heterogeneity.
The two tests for equality are under the null yf distributed with 17 and 18 degrees of freedom, respectively 





























































































Table 4. Expected duration of unemployment for reference persons (in weeks).





























9.9 14.1 12.1 8.0
14.4 16.6 18.3 9.1
23.3 26.0 37.8 7.3
18.5 19.4 8.3
12.8 15.6 19.2 13.4
10.7 13.3 13.6 113
10.7 12.0 11.0 12.3
8.7 8.7 14.9 6.2
The reference female is defined by MARRIED= 1, PROVINCE 1, REPLACEM=0.8, SERVICED, H K D , 
AGE=20,33,48,60, and EXPERIENCED,10,20,30 respectively for the four age groups.
The reference male is defined by MARRIED=1, PROVINCES, REPLACEMD.8, CONSTRUCT=l, 
CONSTR=l, AGE=20,33,48,63, and EXPERIENCED,10,25,40 respectively for the four age groups.




























































































Figure 1. Hazard rates for reference persons.
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